Since no practical low-latency anonymous network could completely eliminate the timing correlation between the original ﬂow and the anonymized ﬂow, all practical low- latency anonymous networks are subject to timing attacks.
Low-latency anonymity systems like Tor are designed to provide support for applications like Web browsing, video streaming, and online chat. To make the commutation between source and destination unlinkable, Tor routes all the traffic through three Tor relays, which are spread across the globe. compromise) only a fraction of the network. A typical goal for low-latency systems is to ensure that an adversary who observes or controls a fraction f of the network can com-promise the anonymity of f2 of the ﬂows. The hope is that making f large would require a high resource expenditure, in building, deploying, and sustaining a scalable, distributed, low-latency anonymity network. 1 Introduction Anonymous communication is full of surprises. This paper discusses some unexpected challenges arising from our experiences deploying Tor, a low-latency general-purpose anonymous communi-cation system. Onion Routing is the most widespread and popular design for the low-latency anonymity systems based on a set of servers that delivers messages, like e-mail, World Wide Web, peer to peer applications, and so on. Each server, which is called onion server, has a pair of public and private key, which the client gets to know the public key. Like all current low-latency anonymity networks, Tor cannot and does not attempt to protect against monitoring of traffic at the boundaries of the Tor network (i.e., the traffic entering and exiting the network).
Low-latency anonymous communication networks require padding to resist timing analysis attacks, and dependent link padding has been proven to prevent these attacks with minimal overhead. In this paper we consider low-latency anonymity networks that implement dependent link padding, and examine various network topologies.
2006-12-1 · variety of anonymity-providing systems, including systems for anonymous web sur ng[18, 2], peer-to-peer anonymity, and network level anonymity in the form of onion routing[12, 10]. Onion routing, equivalent to Chaum’s system as described thus far, yields low-latency connectivity but is vulnerable to timing analysis. An adversary ob- Challenges in deploying low-latency anonymity | Center for Drawing on our experiences deploying Tor (the second-generation onion routing network), we describe social challenges and technical issues that must be faced in building, deploying, and sustaining a scalable, distributed, low-latency anonymity network. Full Text: Dingledine etal2005.pdf. NRL Publication Release Number: 05-1226-0990
PriFi: A Low-Latency Local-Area Anonymous …
Impact of Network Topology on Anonymity and Overhead in Low-Latency Anonymity Networks Conference Paper · July 2010 with 73 Reads How we measure 'reads' Timing analysis in low-latency mix networks